The International Court of Justice (ICJ), or colloquially the World Court, is the only international court that adjudicates general disputes between nations, and gives advisory opinions on international legal issues. It is one of the six organs of the United Nations (UN), and is located in The Hague, Netherlands.

The ICJ is the successor of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which was established in 1920 by the League of Nations. After the Second World War, the League and the PCIJ were replaced by the United Nations and ICJ, respectively. The Statute of the ICJ, which sets forth its purpose and structure, draws heavily from that of its predecessor, whose decisions remain valid. All member states of the UN are party to the ICJ Statute and may initiate contentious legal cases; however, advisory proceedings may be submitted only by certain UN organs and agencies.

Between 22 May 1947 and 29 April 2024, the ICJ has entertained 195 cases, one of which is the dispute  between Cameroon v. Nigeria over Bakassi Peninsula.

Senior Advocate of Nigeria Ndarani Mohammed recently urged President Bola Tinubu to reclaim the Bakassi Peninsula by revisiting the 2002 International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment that awarded the territory to Cameroon. While his position is well-intentioned, this rejoinder respectfully faults the learned Silk’s stance and clarifies why, under international law, Nigeria lacks lawful grounds to seek a reversal of the ICJ’s Bakassi ruling, as explained below.

 

1. The Finality of ICJ Judgments

ICJ judgments are final and binding on the parties involved, as codified in Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, which states: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Furthermore, Article 60 provides that “the judgment is final and without appeal.” The principle of finality, essential for ensuring stability in international relations, means that once a judgment is issued, it cannot be appealed or revisited as a matter of course.

For example, in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (2018), when Costa Rica sought an interpretation of the court’s earlier boundary judgment, the ICJ underscored that interpretation is permissible only to clarify an ambiguous judgment, not to revisit substantive rulings. Similarly, Nigeria’s desire (if any) to “revisit” Bakassi would exceed the narrow scope allowed under the ICJ’s rules.

 

2. Inescapable Limitations under Article 61

The ICJ allows a case to be reopened under Article 61 solely upon the discovery of a decisive fact unknown to both the Court and the party seeking revision at the time of judgment. This basis for revision, defined narrowly, requires the requesting party to satisfy the following conditions:

1. The fact must have existed before the original judgment.
2. The fact must have been unknown to the party despite due diligence.
3. The fact would have been decisive in altering the judgment’s outcome.

In Tunisia v. Libya (1985), Tunisia sought revision based on newly available satellite imagery, arguing it would impact boundary delimitation. However, the ICJ dismissed Tunisia’s request, emphasizing that the imagery did not constitute a “new fact” unknown to both parties at the time of the judgment. Similarly, Nigeria’s potential arguments for revisiting the Bakassi judgment lack any discovery of an unknown and decisive fact, rendering them inadmissible for revision under Article 61.

By Article 61(4) & (5), any request for revision of judgment must be filed within six months of discovering the new fact, and no more than ten years after the original judgment. This timeline reinforces that revisions are an extraordinary remedy, not a means for re-litigating resolved cases. Given that the 2002 judgment on Bakassi has long surpassed this ten-year limit, even a valid new fact (if one existed as posited by the respected Learned Silk) would now be procedurally barred.

The threshold for Article 61 revision has consistently been applied with rigor. In the 2003 Application for Revision of the Bosnia Genocide Case, the ICJ dismissed Bosnia’s request due to insufficiently decisive new facts. This outcome underscores that revision requests must meet an exacting standard, reinforcing the importance of stability and finality in ICJ judgments. Without genuinely unknown, decisive facts that fundamentally alter the case, Nigeria cannot pursue revision.

 

3. Inapplicability of African Customary Law

The assertion that Nigeria should have argued from the perspective of African customary law is not supported by the ICJ’s mandate, which requires it to apply established principles of international law rather than indigenous customs. In Western Sahara Advisory Opinion (1975), for instance, the ICJ clarified that it would apply international legal standards, not local customary practices, to determine territorial sovereignty.

The Court’s mandate requires it to respect established international treaties and customs; the invocation of African customary law does not form a basis for contesting or revising an ICJ judgment. The ICJ’s role is to apply international law uniformly, and in Cameroon v. Nigeria, it did so by interpreting treaties and customary international law principles that govern boundary disputes rather than regional customs.

 

4. International Relations and Legal Stability

The ICJ’s decision on Bakassi also stands as a commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, a principle enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Allowing states to reopen finalized judgments would undermine international legal stability and encourage prolonged territorial conflicts.

Following the ICJ’s ruling in Cameroon v. Nigeria, both countries entered the Green Tree Agreement (2006), brokered by the United Nations, where Nigeria formally agreed to the transfer of Bakassi to Cameroon and outlined provisions for the rights and protections of affected Nigerians in the area. This agreement reflects Nigeria’s commitment to upholding international rulings and preserving peaceful relations with its neighbors. Attempting to reverse the ICJ decision now would violate the principles of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), casting doubt on Nigeria’s commitment to international obligations.

 

5. Conclusion: 

The ICJ judgment on Bakassi is a legally binding decision based on an exhaustive examination of historical records, treaties, and international law principles. Instead of reopening a settled case, Nigeria’s focus should remain on upholding the Green Tree Agreement and maintaining constructive relations with Cameroon. While the sentiment expressed by Mohammed, SAN, reflects concern for those affected by the Bakassi transfer, the legal path he suggests conflicts with the ICJ’s established principles and Nigeria’s obligations under international law.

Levi I. Shaapera, Esq., is a legal research enthusiast with a passion for exploring the intricacies of the law. As the Founder and Editor-in-Chief of LawCompass Electronic Reports (LCER), he is dedicated to providing comprehensive legal analyses and insights. In addition to his role at LCER, Levi serves as the Managing Partner at Leis Law Clinic, where he applies his expertise to offer comprehensive legal services. With a commitment to excellence and a deep passion for the law, Levi plays a pivotal role in advancing legal scholarship and practice.

Email: [email protected] Phone: 09023499999 Website: www.leislawlp.pro

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